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Abstract—For preventing malicious nodes joining wireless sen-
sor networks (WSNs), an access control mechanism is necessary
for the trustworthy cooperation between the nodes. In addition
to access control, recently, privacy has been an important topic
regarding how to achieve privacy without disclosing the real
identity of communicating entities in the WSNs. Based on
elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), in this paper we present
an access control protocol with node privacy (called ACP) for
the WSN. The proposed scheme not only accomplishes the node
authentication but also provides the identity privacy (i.e., source
to destination and vice-versa) for the communicating entities.
Compared with the current state of the art, the proposed solution
can defend actively against attacks. The efficacy and efficiency
of the proposed ACP are confirmed through the test-bed analysis
and performance evaluations.
Index Terms—Access control, authentication, security and
privacy, wireless sensor networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
NOWADAYS, the advancement in electronics, communi-cations, information technologies and the Internet have
led to the rapid proliferation of wireless sensor networks
(WSN). WSNs are envisioned as the future technology, and are
emerging as an interesting research area among the research
organizations, academia, and industries [1]. Sensor-enabled
products and their networks are becoming commonplace, and
central to everyday life, e.g., healthcare, smart homes, object
tracking and monitoring, and so on. Moreover, according to
the latest finding “wireless sensor networks 2012-2021” [2]
- WSN businesses will grow rapidly to over two billion US
dollars for the future systems in 2022.
WSNs consist of a large number of inexpensive sensors
that have quite limited resources (e.g., low processing units,
low bandwidth, limited battery power, and low memory) [3].
Sensors are small in size, and are integrated with a sensing unit
and wireless communication capabilities. These nodes are be-
ing deployed in a wide terrain to perform their intended tasks
efficiently. Typically, heterogeneous sensor networks are more
practical, having better network performance (i.e., multi-hop
communication, delay tolerant, etc.), provide scalability and
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efficient load-balancing [4]–[6]. However, with the increasing
ubiquity of WSNs in real applications (e.g., hospitals, military,
wildlife monitoring), WSNs data will be available almost
everywhere, anytime. Inevitably, much of WSNs information
is highly sensitive and critical, and thus it is possible that an
adversary may introduce malicious nodes in a network to leak
the sensors information (and/or insert false reports) without
the consent of the network owner. In addition, an adversary
can purposefully interrupt the network smooth functionality
by deploying the malicious nodes into the network. There-
fore, to protect such a information leakage from the global
adversaries and malicious nodes, access control mechanisms
are to be enforced to real WSNs from the beginning of a WSN
deployment [7]–[13].
Another big forthcoming issue for actually deploying WSNs
is how to achieve (access control with) network privacy
without disclosing the sensors (real) identity (ID), which is
considered as one of the imperative security concerns for
critical and real WSNs. For instance, consider a WSN (e.g.,
wildlife monitoring) scenario, where the endangered animals
[14], [15] are being monitored and detected using a low-
cost wireless sensor nodes. A deployed sensor node sends
(animal) report (including source and destination IDs) to the
base station. However, in such a use-case, the hunter may
directly deploy a malicious node to generate the false tracking
report for the endangered animal species. In addition to that
an adversary can eavesdrop the insecure wireless communi-
cation to trace the animal location by analyzing the message
header that contains both the source and destination identities
(IDs). This kind of privacy breach would cause severe life-
threatening consequences to the endangered animals. Thus,
how to achieve efficient access control without disclosing the
nodes identities (i.e., source and destination and vice-versa)
has become an important requirement in real sensor networks.
In recent years, many access control protocols have been
proposed to protect WSNs [7]–[13], as shown in Section II-A.
Most of the schemes focus on authentication and key estab-
lishment to address access control, neglecting other relevant
but sometimes paramount aspects such as privacy. Generally,
privacy includes two types of concerns, data-centric privacy
and context-aware privacy [14]. Data-centric privacy includes
secure integrity of the data gathered that is transmitted to
the sink. While, in a context-aware privacy, how to prevent
adversaries from gaining access to the context information, for
instance, identity, physical location and so on. Data-centric
privacy has been addressed significantly (e.g., Zhang et al
[16], Sicari et al [17], Yang et al [18] and Yao et al [19]
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schemes), but ignoring the node identity privacy. Similarly, in
the context-aware privacy, recently, Debnath et al [14], Li et al
[15] and Pnogaliur-Xiao [20] have paid a significant attention
to the source node privacy and leaving out the destination
node privacy. In these protocols, the source node identity (i.e.,
sensor) is either hashed or encrypted, whereas, the destination
node identity is being used a plain-text. However, in the
real WSN most of the queries are generally requested and/or
issued at the point of base stations or gateway nodes. In such
scenarios, the existing solutions can provide the guaranteed
source nodes (e.g., base station/gateway) identity privacy,
but they cannot provide the destination nodes (such as, a
sensor node) identity privacy. Therefore, an attacker can easily
monitor the base station/gateway initiated wireless packets,
and can intercept the sensor nodes identity (i.e., destination
node). Thus, it is needless to say, the identity privacy of the
involved nodes (source to destination and vice-versa) not been
properly addressed in real WSNs.
The aim of this work is to design an access control protocol
with node privacy (ACP) that would take care of the node
(identity) privacy (i.e., from source to destination and vice-
versa) in WSNs. The proposed ACP utilizes elliptic curve
cryptography (ECC), and provides explicit mutual authenti-
cation between the (transmitter and receiver) nodes, and also
establishes a shared secret session key. At the same time,
the scheme ensures nodes privacy, i.e., without disclosing
their real identities. Similar to Pnogaliur-Xiaos protocol [20],
the scheme proposed in this paper also seamlessly integrates
two underlying cryptographic primitives (e.g., encryption and
hash value) to achieve the access control (i.e., authentication
and key establishment) with node privacy. The ACP scheme
possesses identity privacy while providing robust security
against passive and active attacks. We have demonstrated a
test-bed on Tmote Sky platform for evaluating the ACP. In
this paper, we analyse the ability of proposed scheme (e.g.,
efficiency) in terms of overhead when compared to the existing
literatures, and believe that the proposed protocol can be used
in many practical WSNs where identity privacy is highly
required.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section
II details the existing work on access control and privacy-
preserving schemes. Section III presents the proposed scheme
and Section IV presents security analysis. Section V details
implementation and performance evaluations of the proposed
ACP. Finally, Section VI concludes the ACP scheme.
II. RELATED WORK
The section is divided into two: access control and privacy
preserving protocols.
A. Access Control Protocols
Zhou et al proposed an access control protocol, which is
based on ECC [7]. The scheme is more efficient than the
RSA-based public key cryptography schemes. Authors claim
that a new node (using the timestamp) could join in the
network any time and support key establishment. However,
to authenticate a sensor node, Zhou et al’s scheme incurred
substantially high computational and communicational costs.
In real WSNs, the high consumption rates, therefore, may be
a severe bottleneck. Thereby, based on ECC and hash-chain,
Huang’s proposed a novel access control protocol (NACP)
[8]. NACP is quite adequate for low-powered sensor nodes.
Huang’s showed that the NACP can be easily implemented
as a dynamic access control system because all the secrets
and broadcasting information in existing nodes should not
be updated once a new node is added into the network. In
2009, Kim-Lee pointed out that NACP scheme is susceptible
to a message replay attack, and has lack of the hash-chain
renewability problem, for details the readers may refer to
[9]. In addition, Kim-Lee proposed an enhanced novel access
control protocol (ENACP) that uses a hash-chain approach
to perform authentication and key establishment between two
nodes [9].
Later, Zeng et al [10] and Shen et al [11] showed the
ENACP also suffers from inherent design flaws and is vul-
nerable to many attacks (e.g., masquerade attack). Extending
the same idea of NACP, Huang’s proposed a new design of
access control protocol that exploiting the clock of a node
and provided security at higher computational cost than the
previous proposed schemes [12].
In 2012, Lee et al [13] demonstrated that ENACP is not
practical for real environments and is susceptible to message
forgery attack and a new node masquerade attack. To solve
ENACP problems, Lee et al proposed practical access con-
trol protocols (PACPs) for WSNs and claimed that PACPs
are secure against many attacks [13]. PACPs comprised of
two schemes, namely, secure PACP (secPACP) and memory-
efficient PACP (ePACP). However, Chen et al [21] pointed
out that the large number of pre-stored keys (in PACPs) are
subjected to the adversary attacks and required unnecessarily
huge keys storage overhead at a resource-hungry sensor node.
Note that in the aforementioned works, the authors have
given considerable efforts to the access control protocols,
leaving out other relevant but sometimes paramount aspects
like node anonymity (i.e., identity privacy).
B. Privacy-preserving Protocols
During the last decade, a significant amount of research
papers have been published, addressing mainly two privacy
concerns in WSNs: (i) data-centric privacy, and (ii) context-
aware privacy.
Data-centric privacy focuses on proving protection for the
data items. Zhang et al proposed two privacy-preserving data
aggregation protocols, namely, PASKOS (privacy-preserving
based on anonymously shared keys and omniscient sink) and
PASKIS (privacy-preserving based on anonymously shared
keys and ignorant sink) [16]. Authors exploited the concept
of data perturbation, where each node computes a perturbed
data, i.e., adding the secret keyed value to the sensed data and
transmits this perturbed data to the sink node. In PASKOS,
the secret keyed values are computed based on pre-distributed
key rings, which are randomly chosen from a key pool, offline.
Authors assumed that the sink possesses the whole key pool
in PASKOS; whereas, in PASKIS the sink node doesn’t have
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knowledge of the key pool. Sicari et al proposed DyDAP
(dynamic data aggregation scheme for privacy aware protocol)
that provides an end-to-end secure perturbation based data
aggregation by employing a privacy function [17].
Yang et al proposed a precision-enhanced and encryption-
mixed privacy-preserving data aggregation (PEPDA) [18]. The
main focus of PEPDA is to reduce collision during data
transmission and energy consumption, and how to compensate
losses that are caused by the collision. Based on the similar
idea that proposed by Yang et al [18], Yao et al proposed
two privacy-preserving data aggregation protocols: PDAAS
(privacy-preserving data aggregation against non-colluded ag-
gregator and sink), and PDACAS (privacy-preserving data ag-
gregation against colluded aggregator and sink) for two-tiered
WSNs with mobile nodes [19]. The PDAAS and PDACAS
protocols also exploited perturbation concept to secure the
sensor data, and thus provide the data privacy.
Context-aware privacy ensures the privacy of context-
related information, such as, the location from which the data
being transmitted (including source node identity) and the
location where the data being received (including destination
node identity). To deal with the node privacy, Pongaliur-Xiao
proposed a source node privacy and packet recovery under
eavesdropping and node compromised attacks (SPENA) [20].
SPENA has employed on the encryption-based cryptosystem
that increases the source node privacy. In addition, SPENA
uses a one-way hash-chain based keying system to hide the
source node information from the adversary. Debnath et al
proposed privacy in WSNs using ring signature, utilizing the
ID-based public key cryptography [14]. Source-location pri-
vacy (SLP) based routing scheme is proposed by Li et al [15].
The SLP uses two-phase routing: routing to a single randomly
selected intermediate node (SRIN) and routing through the
network mixing ring (NMR).
Notice that, Debnath et al [14], Li et al [15] and Pnogaliur-
Xiao [20] have paid the attention to the source node privacy
but ignoring the destination node privacy.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
This section presents the proposed ACP, i.e., access control
with node (identity) privacy. As shown in Fig. 1, consider
the practical (heterogeneous) WSN that maintains the network
load-balancing, energy-efficiency, and lifetime [4]–[6]. The
network architecture consists of three types of entities: the
low-cost sensor node (SN), the coordinator node (C), and the
base station (BS). Typically, a SN is small in size and low
cost; thus, it is restricted on computation, memory storage,
and communication capability. Generally SNs are deployed to
sense and collect the environmental reading continuously or
event/time based. As shown in Fig. 1, the WSN is divided into
the cells and each cell has a coordinator (C) node, where the
deployed SNs securely forward their sensory data to the base
station through the C node and the other way around. In addi-
tion, the C node can also collect and aggregate the environment
data securely from the SNs within a cell [22], [23]. The C node
has powerful resources with different capabilities and it can














IDU Identity of sensor (U)
IDC Identity of Cell (C)
LKS Large key space
EK [M ] Encryption using secret key (K)
DK [M ] Decryption using secret key (K)
Fq A finite field
E Elliptic curve defined on finite field Fq with prime order n
G Group of elliptic curve points on E
P A point on elliptic curve E with order n
r large prime number
β a salt
π a long-term secret
h(.) Secure one-way hash function, SHA1/SHA2/SHA3/MD5
|| Concatenation operation
Finally, the whole WSN is controlled by the base station (BS).
The BS has large bandwidth, strong computing capability,
large memory, and high power to support the cryptographic,
routing and other requirements for the whole network.
The proposed scheme includes three phases: (a) system
initialization; (b) authentication and key establishment; and
(c) new node addition phase.
Before starting the WSN deployment, consider the elliptic
curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP), to find an integer
r, given an elliptic curve E defined over Fq, a point P ∈
E(Fq) of order n, and a point Q = rP where 0 ≤ r ≤ n−1,
as shown in [13]. The notation and description are shown in
Table I.
A. System Initialization Phase
The BS, first, performs off-line tasks and distributes the
required security parameters to the sensor and coordinator
nodes, as follows.
1) The BS generates a large key space, LKS, (e.g.,K1,
K2,K3, · · ·KN ) and key identifiers (Kidi), identities
for sensors (IDs) and cell coordinators (IDCi).
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Node U C (coordinator node)
 computes: GU= rUP = (GxU , GyU),
SU= h(IDU||GxU||πUC||T1) and N=EKU [IDU , rU , T1]
N , SU , GU , KidU , T1
 checks: (T2-T1) ≤ ∆T decrypts N
 verifies: h(IDU||GxU||πUC||T1)=SU , T1* = T1, IDU* = IDU
  computes: GC= rCP= (GxC , GyC),
 SC = (IDC||GxC ||πUC|| rU|| T2), M = EKU[ IDC , rC , T2]
M ,GC , SC ,T2
 Checks = (T3-T2) ≤ ∆T
 decrypts: DKU[M] and
 verifies: h(IDC||GxC|| πUC||rU|| T2) = SC
 computes: Z = h (IDC||IDU||πUC||rU||rC||T3) and
 Q = EKU[Z, T3]
Q , T3
 checks = (T4-T3) ≤ ∆T
 decrypts Q using KU
 computes and verifies: Z = h(IDC ||IDU ||πUC||rU||rC||T3)
Fig. 2. Flow of authentication and key establishment.
2) The BS chooses a sensor node (e.g., U) for the cell
deployment and assigns the cell identity (IDCi) to the
U, where U will be deployed. For each sensor, U, the
BS generates a salt (β), and computes an unique secret,
i.e., πUC = h(IDU ||β||IDCi||IDBS).
3) Now, the BS installs a secret key (KU ) and its identifier
(KidU ), πUCi and IDCi to the dedicated node (i.e., node
U), which is selected for the dedicated cell (e.g., Ci).
Finally, all parameters of the assigned sensors (i.e., IDs,
secret keys and corresponding key identifiers, and unique
secret, πUC = h(IDU ||β||IDCi||IDBS)) are stored to
their corresponding C node.
Further, to execute the scheme, this paper has made the
following assumptions: (i) in a cell, each sensor synchronizes
the clock with its coordinator node (i.e., C) using Kim et al
[1] and/or Du et al [24]; and (ii) The BS and the C node are
trusted and secured entities.
B. Authentication and Key Establishment Phase
To establish a pairwise key with the C node, node U initiates
the following procedure:
1) The node U generates a random number rU and com-
putes the point GU = rUP = (GxU , GyU ) over the
elliptic curve, SU = h(IDU || GxU ||πUC)||T1) and
N = EKU [IDU , rU , T1]. Here, E is the encryption
algorithm (e.g., AES (advanced encryption standard)
[25]), and T1 is the current time-stamp of node U. The
U then sends N,SU , GU , T1,KidU to the C node.
2) Upon receiving message, the C node checks if (T2 −
T1) ≤ ∆T ; if that is not true, then aborts the ACP.
Here, ∆T is the expected transmission delay. Otherwise,
the C node gets the corresponding secret key of KidU
(i.e., KU ) from own database and decrypts N and
obtains IDU ∗, rU ∗, T1∗. It computes SU ∗(= h(IDU ||
GxU ||πUC ||T1)) and verifies SU ∗ = SU , IDU ∗ = IDU
and T1∗ = T1. If this holds, then the C node is assured
that GU is generated by a legal node. Now the C node
generates a random number rC and computes the point
GC = rCP = (GxC , GyC), SC = h(IDC ||GxC
||πUC ||rU ||T2), and M = EKU [IDC , rC , T2]. Here,
E denotes the identical encryption scheme (AES [25])
and T2 is the current time-stamp of the C node. The C
node sends M,GC , SC , T2 to the node U.
3) Now, the node U verifies (T3− T2) ≤ ∆T ; if it holds,
then further steps are executed; otherwise, the node U
aborts the system. The node U decrypts message M and
obtains IDC∗, rC∗, T2∗. To verify SC, the node U com-
putes SC∗(= h(IDC ||GxC ||πUC ||rU ||T2)) and verifies
SC
∗ = SC, IDC∗ = IDC and T2∗ = T2. If conditions
hold, the node U assured that GC is generated by a legal
C node, and it computes Z = h(IDC ||IDU ||πUC ||rU
||rC ||T3), and Q = EKU [Z, T3]. It then sends Q,T3
to the C node.
4) After receiving a message, the C node verifies (T4 −
T3) ≤ ∆T ; if it is true, then further steps are executed.
Otherwise, C aborts the system. Now, the C node de-
crypts Q using KU and obtains Z∗ and T3∗. Thereafter,
it computes Z = h(IDC ||IDU ||πUC ||rU ||rC ||T3) and
verifies Z∗ = Z and T3∗ = T3. If this holds, then the C
node confirms that the node U is a legitimate node and Z
will be used for further secure communication between
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the node U and the C node. The flow of authentication
and key establishment phase is shown in Fig. 2.
C. New Sensor Addition Phase
It is very practical to replace the sensor nodes with ex-
hausted batteries with new sensors during the network opera-
tion. In the proposed scheme, replacing the exhausted sensors
with the new nodes in a cell is easy.
The BS simply preloads the required parameters, KX ,
KidX , πXCi, and IDCi (refer initialization phase, Section III-
A) to the newly added sensor node (e.g., node X) and assigns
the dedicated cell where it needs replacing. In addition, the
BS securely passes the information of the new sensor to the
assigned cell, as shown in Fig. 3. After deploying the new
sensor node into the cell, it will perform authentication and key
establishment (as shown in Fig. 2) and maintain a trustworthy






Fig. 3. New node addition.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Security Analysis
The security of the proposed framework is based on secrecy
of the one-way hash function, the elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem (ECDLP), and the encryption algorithm.
To facilitate the security discussion, consider that an
attacker has full control over the wireless channels e.g.,
he/she can insert, drop, modify, replay the wireless messages,
and/or steal the nodes identities. Based on the attack model,
the security analysis includes the security against a message
replay attack, legal node masquerading attack, message
forgery attack, identity threat, Sybil attack, and node capture
and fabrication threat [12], [13].
Resistance to the message replay attack: In this attack,
an attacker wants to perform a message replay attack using
previously broadcasted messages. For instance, an adversary
sends the node U’s captured message, N,SU , GU ,KidU , T1
to the C node, at time Ta (i.e., adversary time-stamp). The
adversary must then provide rU and real-time T1 to verify the
sub-message SU at the C node. However, it is not feasible for
the adversary to obtain rU under a practical assumption that
the ECDLP is hard to breach. Moreover, the replayed message
will be detected at an early stage because of the time interval
(T2−T1) < ∆T and the attackers time stamp (Ta) would not
be verified at the C node. Here, ∆T is the mutually agreed
transmission delay between the node U and the coordinator
(C) node. Therefore, an attacker cannot succeed in replaying
old messages to the node C.
Similarly, assuming that an adversary sends the C’s
captured message (M,GC , SC , T2) to the node U at time
Ta. The attacker then also would have to provide rC and
real-time T2 to verify the sub-message SC at the node
U. However, to obtain a real rC is hard because of the
complexity of the ECDLP. In addition, the attacker attempts
will be detected because of the mutually agreed time interval
condition, i.e., (T3− T2) < ∆T . Thus, the adversary cannot
succeed in the replay message attack at the node U. 
Resistance to legal node masquerade attack: In the
proposed scheme, the node U computes SU with the secret
of πUC and the random number rU for the current session.
Similarly, for the identical session, the C node computes
SC with the secret πUC and rC . Assuming that even if the
adversary could monitor a message flow between the node
U and the C node, and obtains the SU , GU and SC , GC ,
respectively, as shown in Fig. 2, it is hard for the adversary to
derive the correct SU (= h(IDU ||GxU ||πUC)||T1)) and SC
(= h(IDC ||GxC ||πUC ||rU ||T2)) due to the one-way hash
operation. In addition, the adversary could not derive the
legalized session key Z = h(IDC ||IDU ||πUC ||rU ||rC ||T3),
it is computed over the rU and rC that are difficult to derive
due to the ECDLP hardness. Therefore, the our scheme can
resistance to a legal node masquerade attack. 
Resistance to forgery attack: Assume that an attacker
has intercepted values (e.g., GU = rUP and GC = rCP )
by the monitoring on the wireless communication channel
between the node U and the C node. Now the attacker
may attempt to establish a legitimate message, for instance,
N,Sa,Ga,KidU , Ta. However, the attacker would not be
able established a legal Sa because he/she does not have
knowledge of the secret πUC . More importantly, under the
assumption of ECDLP, it is very hard for the attacker to derive
the random number rU and rC from GU and GC , respectively.
Therefore, the attacker message N,Sa,Ga,KidU , Ta will be
captured by the C node. Thus, the proposed ACP is resistant
to a message forgery attack. 
Protection from privacy threat: Recall context-centric
privacy (e.g., identity) and data-centric privacy from Section
II-B.
Node identity privacy (i.e., context-centric): In the proposed
scheme, the node identity privacy can be guaranteed by the
security of cryptosystem (i.e., EK [m]). If the ciphertext is
secure, so does the node identity [20]. Consider an adversary,
he/she monitors the broadcasts, tries to intercept the source and
destination nodes identities to learn about the WSN by recreat-
ing the context from the flow of wireless messages, which are
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either time-based or event-based temporal information. The
mapping of node identities data can breach the privacy of
WSNs. However, in the proposed scheme, an attacker can
compare the two packets (i.e., broadcasted messages) as string
length of bits, but cannot derive the nodes identities from the
source and destination (and vice-versa), since IDs are shielded,
i.e., encrypted, N = EKU [IDU , rU , T1] and M = EKU [
IDC , rC , T2], using the secret key KU that possessed by the
legal parties (such as, the node U and the C node).
Data-centric privacy: An attacker cannot illegally breach
the data privacy in the ACP scheme. Since, two legal
communicating entities being mutually authenticated each
other, establishing a hashed key (Z = h(IDC ||IDU ||πUC ||rU
||rC ||T3)), which is an unique key for every session, and
will be used to provide the data protection for the current
session. Hence the attacker cannot breach the data privacy
over wireless channels. 
Protection from Sybil attack: In this attack, a malicious
sensor poses multiple fake identities to other non-compromised
nodes. It is widely accepted that the Sybil attacks are un-
avoidable but they can be detected. However, in the proposed
protocol, the secret SU (= h(IDU ||GxU ||πUC ||T1)) of node
U is computed with the real identity of node U (IDU ), secret
(πUC), and timestamp (cf., Section III-B: Step 1). Thus, a
malicious node U cannot claim a new identity IDU ′ in the
vicinity of C node, and therefore, the proposed scheme can
withstand the Sybil attack [11]. Furthermore without knowing
the secret key (KU ) of the node U (within a cell), it is difficult
for the Sybil node to decrypt N = EKU [IDU , rU , T1]. More-
over, to construct communication with other nodes through
authentication, the attacker must obtain the real identity (IDU )
and time-stamp (T1) of a legal node U, otherwise it would
be difficult for an attacker to establish a pair-wise key. On
the other hand, if an attacker somehow compromised the
node U, then he/she cannot communicate with the other non-
compromised nodes because the attacker does not possess the
secrets (KU , πUC) of non-compromised nodes.
Furthermore, an intrusion detection techniques based on
mutual guarding have been proposed by Bhuse et al [26], [27]
means if an attacker succeeds in sending a fake identity to a
legal node, then it is practical to detect the Sybil attack using
a mutual guarding mechanism [26], [27]. For this mechanism,
when two or more nodes (e.g., nodes A and node B) are in
direct broadcasting range where the broadcasted information
sent by both nodes can be received by them, this is said to be
mutually guarded.
For a simple illustration, consider an example of how two
nodes can mutually guard each other, as shown in Fig. 4 [26].
Suppose that an attacker is located in a common area of the
node A and node B. The attacker sends a message to the node
B by using the source information (e.g., ID, location, etc.) of
the node A. Note that in this case, node A also receives the
information that is broadcasted by the attacker. Therefore,
node A can detect the presence of a Sybil node (to some
magnitude) that being masquerading as node A. 
Security against node capture and fabrication attack:
A B
Attacker
Fig. 4. Mutual guarding within a cell.
TABLE II
SECURITY COMPARISON
ENACP [9] secPACP [13] ePACP [13] PASKOS [16] ACP
R1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 No Yes Yes ND Yes
R3 No Yes Yes No Yes
R4 No No No No Yes
R5 ND Partial Partial ND Yes
R6 ND Yes Yes ND Yes
R1-Resist replay attack; R2-Resist to sensor masquerade attack; R3-Resist
forgery attack; R4-Protection from identity threat; R5-Protection from Sybil
threat; R6-Protection against node capture and fabrication threat; ND - no
discussion.
In practice, sensors are deployed in unattended and hostile
environments. Therefore, one could physically capture a node
and extract all the stored keys and other information (such
as ID, clocks, and other parameters) about the network. To
disturb the smooth functionality of the network, an attacker
may fabricate a clone (node fabrication) with a compromised
node. However, the proposed scheme is a variants of pairwise
key pre-distribution protocols, which provide perfect network
resilience against a compromised node attack – for more
details the reader may refer to [13], [28], [29]. Moreover, in
the proposed scheme, the C node can periodically monitor the
misbehavior of SNs using [30] within its cell and informs the
BS upon a detection because the proposed scheme is divided
into a number of cells. Thus, compromising a node and node
fabrication attack in the cell does not affect the security of
non-compromised cells. 
Table II summarizes the security comparisons of the pro-
posed ACP with [9], [13], [16], in terms of the security of
access control method with node privacy. It can be seen from
Table II that the ENACP is vulnerable to many attacks, cf.,
[10], [11], [13]. Similarly, the PACPs (secPACP and ePACP)
may be subjected to various adversary attacks [21]. In addition,








Fig. 5. Experimental setup.
node identities privacy. Whereas, the ACP scheme achieved
the node identity privacy (from source to destination and vice-
versa) than the ENACP [9], PACPs [13] and PASKOS [16].
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate the proposed ACP by implementing the cryp-
tographic components on the experimental test-bed using the
TelosB platform.
A. Implementation and experimental setup
Our implementation environment is TinyOS 2 [31] run-
ning on the TelosB platform, having a 16-bit, 8 MHz CPU
(MSP430) with 48 KB of program ROM and 10 KB of RAM
[32]. Networked embedded systems C (nesC) being used as
the development environment. Our test-bed has the coordinator
node (C) that is serially connected to the laptop (base-station),
and the sensor node (U), cf. Fig. 5. Both the nodes’ clocks are
synchronized using [25]. Following the Section III-B, the node
U initiates the broadcast as a sender, while the node C acts as
a cell coordinator, as shown in Fig. 2.
In experimental settings, we choose to use the AES (Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard) symmetric-key algorithm for the
encryption, which is integrated in CC2420 radios [32]. For
the ECC operations, we used TinyECC library [33]. TinyECC
supports all elliptic curve operations over Fp, including point
addition, point doubling and scalar point multiplication for
TelosB platform. It supports SECG (standards for efficient
cryptography group) recommended 128-bit, 160-bit and 192-
bit elliptic curve domain parameters. For hashing, note that
we recommend implementers to use high security hashing
algorithms. We choose to use SHA-1 function for the sake of
experiment purpose that provide one-way hashing as a base
hash function. In ACP, we choose to use secp160r1 defined
over a 160-bit prime field. The key size (KU ) for encryption
is 128-bit, the length of time-stamp is 32-bit, 128-bit SHA-1
[34], and the key identity (Kid) is 8-bit. Therefore, the length
of messages i.e., {N,SU , GU , T1,KidU}, {M,GC , SC , T2},
and {Q,T3} are 57, 56, 20 bytes, respectively.
B. Evaluation
It is accepted that any inclusion of security principles will
incur additional overhead. Nevertheless, due to the sensor
nodes scarcity nature, this paper evaluates the price of security
(in terms of program size (i.e.,memory), execution time and
energy overhead for each operation of the proposed scheme) at
the sensor node. Table III shows security prices at the sensor
node including the following operations: ECC (the time for
one point multiplication computation over an elliptic curve);
TABLE III
SECURITY PRICES FOR THE PROPOSED ACP
RAM (KB) ROM(KB) time (in ms) Energy (in µJ)
ECC 1.25 13.6 2,765 14,931
AES 0.76 10.1 3.9 21.06
SHA-1 1.9 9.7 36.3 196.02
TABLE IV
COMPUTATION COST COMPARISONS
ENACP [9] [12] SecPACP [13] ePACP [13] ACP
Tpm 2Tpm 5Tpm 2Tpm 2Tpm 1Tpm
Thc 2Thc – – – –
Th 4Th 2Th 5Th 4Th 3Th
TC – – – – 3TC
Tpm - the time for executing point-multiplication; Thc - the time for
executing hash-chain; Th - the time for executing one-way hash function;
TC - the time for performing cryptosystem (i.e., encryption and decryption).
AES (the time for executing an encryption); and SHA-1 (the
time for executing the one-way hash function).
All together, our program code required 3.91 KB of RAM
and 33.4 KB of ROM storage at the node U. The node U took
2805 ms execution time, which is due to the fact of (expensive)
scalar point multiplication operations (i.e., computing the point
Q = rP , required 2,765 ms).
The energy consumption of each operation can be estimated
using W = V × I × t, here V is the voltage, I is the current
draw in active mode with radio off, and t is execution time. The
voltage (i.e., 3 V(volt)) and the current (i.e., 1.8 µA (micro-
amp)) values are directly obtained from TelosB data-sheet
[32]. By multiplying the values of V and I with the execution
time (t), we can determine the amount of energy required
to execute the ECC, AES, and SHA-1 operations [25], [35],
[36]. As we can seen in Table II, the total amount of energy
consumed in ECC, AES and SHA-1 is (≈) 15,148 µJ. Notice
that the impact of energy consumption from the AES and
SHA-1 computation is low, i.e., 21.06 µJ, and 196.02 µJ,
respectively. Whereas, with the fact of the time complexity
of the point multiplications, it consumes significant amount of
energy, i.e., 14,931 µJ.
Additionally, Table IV illustrates the computational over-
head comparison of the proposed scheme with ENACP [9],
Huangs [12] and PACPs [13]. ENACP requires two point
multiplications (2Tpm), two hash chain operations (2Thc)
and four hash computations (4Th); Huangs scheme requires
five point multiplications (5Tpm) and two hash computa-
tions (2Th), and secPACP and ePACP (in PACPs) requires
(2Tpm+5Thc) and (2Tpm+4Th), respectively. However in the
proposed scheme (cf., Fig. 2), a sensor node computes a single
point multiplication operation (1Tpm), and three one-way hash
operations (3Th). In order to achieve context and data privacy,
a sensor node needs to perform three cryptosystem operations
(i.e., two encryption and one decryption) that does not require
high computational complexity.
Considering our implementations (i.e., the time to perform



























Point multiplication timing comparisons
Fig. 6. Point multiplication comparisons in the terms of execution time on a
sensor node.
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Point multiplication energy comparisons
Fig. 7. Point multiplication comparisons in the terms of energy consumptions
on a sensor node.
ms) – ENACP [9] and PCAPs [13] takes 5,530 ms and 5,530
ms, respectively, as shown in Fig 6. Huangs scheme [12]
requires 13,825 ms, whereas the proposed ACP incurred less
time than the protocols presented in [9], [12], [13]. Moreover,
Fig. 7 shows the point multiplication energy consumption
comparisons on a sensor node – ENACP [9] and PCAPs
[13] consumes 29,862 µJ and 29,862 µJ, respectively. Huangs
scheme [12] consumes 74,655 µJ of energy. While on the
contrary our proposed ACP required 14,931 µJ of energy for
the point multiplication operation. From Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, it
can be observed the cost of point multiplication operation of
the proposed ACP required the half of time and energy.
As shown in Table III, a hash operation consumes 196.02
µJ of energy on a sensor node in our proposed scheme.
Considering the similar settings, the ENACP scheme [9]
requires 784.08 µJ of energy for executing 4Th operations.
Huangs scheme [12] consumes 392.04 µJ for 2Th operations;
and SecPACP [13] and ePACP [13] requires 980 µJ for 5Th
operations and 784.08 µJ for 4Th operations, respectively.






















SHA -1 Energy consumption in mirco Joule
Fig. 8. SHA-1 energy consumption comparisons.
operations while providing the source to destination (and vice-
versa) node identity privacy. Fig. 8 roughly summarizing the
total amount energy consumption for SHA-1 operations in the
[9], [12], [13] and the proposed ACP.
VI. CONCLUSION
In real WSN, an access control mechanism is necessary for
the trustworthy cooperation between the nodes, where sensors
send/receive request to/from the base-station. In such two-way
wireless networks, however, compromising identity privacy
(of the nodes) can inadvertently leak event privacy and it
can give away the event occurrence without the consent of
the WSN owner. This paper has proposed an access control
scheme with node identity privacy for WSN using ECC, hash
function, and cryptosystem. The proposed scheme achieves
the access control while taking care of the identity privacy
(source to destination and vice-versa) of a node and provides
robust security. We have evaluated the proposed ACP using a
test-bed on the TelosB platform. We have analyzed the ability
of ACP (e.g., efficiency) in terms of overhead and energy,
and compared to the existing literatures, i.e.,, ENACP, Huangs
scheme, and PACPs. We believe that the proposed ACP can be
feasible in many practical WSN applications where the access
control and identity privacy are highly required.
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